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Abstract—CAPTCHAs are difficult for humans to use, causing
frustration. Alternatives have been proposed, but user studies
equate usability to solvability. We consider the user perspective
to include workload and context of use. We assess traditional
text-based CAPTCHAs alongside PlayThru, a ‘gamified’ veri-
fication mechanism, and NoBot, which uses face biometrics. A
total of 87 participants were tasked with ticket-buying across
three conditions: (1) all three mechanisms in comparison, and
NoBot three times (2) on a laptop, and (3) on a tablet. A
range of quantitative and qualitative measurements explored the
user perspective. Quantitative results showed that participants
completed reCAPTCHAs quickest, followed by PlayThru and
NoBot. Participants were critical of NoBot in comparison but
praised it in isolation. Despite reporting negative experiences
with reCAPTCHAs, they were the preferred mechanism, due to
familiarity and a sense of security and control. Although slower,
participants praised NoBot’s completion speeds, but regarded
using personal images as invading privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A CAPTCHA (“Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart”) [21] is a challenge-
response test where the user is tasked to recognise and enter
a sequence of distorted characters. CAPTCHAs are integrated
into web services with an aim to allow access only to humans
and prevent automated programs (robots) from exploiting
online resources (e.g., forum comment sections).
Now an established part of the online experience,
CAPTCHAs are nonetheless a hurdle to users’ completion of
tasks. Pogue [19] says users are together wasting 17 person-
years every day on solving CAPTCHAs, calling this immense
effort “a disgraceful waste of our lives”. There are technical
solutions which remove the need for user effort, but they are
difficult to implement [7].
In this study, we assess the user experience of three mech-
anisms. We look at (1) the traditional text-based CAPTCHAs,
specifically reCAPTCHA1 provided by Google (v 1.0), (2) an
alternative called PlayThru2, that requires the user to drag
and drop elements in a simple game and (3) a technology
which could mitigate the cognitive and physical demands
of CAPTCHAs called NoBot3. NoBot is a face-recognition
solution that aims to minimise user effort using capabilities
of the host device (i.e., a camera) and service-based image
processing. The study was designed and partially conducted
before the introduction of reCAPTCHA v 2.0 that only re-
quires a tick from the user. For NoBot in particular, we
assess the user experience of repeated use, across two devices:
laptop and tablet. Examining use of a tablet is important as
interactions and purchases become increasingly mobile, posing
significant usability challenges due to virtual keyboards [10].
Our study makes methodological advances by comparing
three human verification mechanisms in a realistic scenario us-
ing comprehensive quantitative and qualitative measurements.
87 participants were tasked with using a mock-up of an event
ticket-purchasing website, rather than solving CAPTCHAs.
We consider it essential to engage participants with a realistic
primary task since a study will not yield generalisable results
unless conditions reflect real life. This is in line with the ISO
9241-11 [14] standard, which defines usability not only as
efficiency at achieving specified goals, but also effectiveness
and satisfaction in a specified context of use.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The
next section summarises the findings of previous studies of
CAPTCHAs and takes a critical look at the methodologies
used. We then describe the design of our study, followed by
a presentation of quantitative and qualitative study findings.
Findings are then discussed before concluding remarks and
suggestions for future work in the area.
II. RELATED WORK
The majority of existing research on the usability of
CAPTCHAs has compared different types of CAPTCHAs in
terms of solvability. The usability of CAPTCHAs is narrowly
defined as users’ capability to decipher “squiggly” characters.
In some cases qualities of user perception are identified
1https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/old/intro
2http://areyouahuman.com/about-playthru
3The developer did not commercialise this product and wishes to remain
anonymous.
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secondary to the laudable (but restricted) pursuit of less
cognitively-demanding alternatives to CAPTCHAs.
Bursztein et al. [5] conducted a large-scale study where
workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk and an under-
ground CAPTCHA breaking service solved more than
318k CAPTCHAs (from 12 image-based and 8 audio-based
schemes). This demonstrated that humans find CAPTCHAs
difficult with audio-based ones being particularly difficult.
Reynaga et al. [20] compared nine CAPTCHA schemes on
smartphones with alternative input mechanisms that aimed to
increase usability. Although participants considered traditional
input mechanisms to be error-prone, they preferred them due
to familiarity. The study is notable for capturing a variety
of subjective user perceptions (e.g., ratings for memorability,
preference) and free-text responses from participants. When
discussing their findings, the authors stress that both correct-
ness of solving a CAPTCHA and user perceptions ought to
be considered during evaluation.
Gossweiler et al. [9] evaluated a CAPTCHA alternative
based on image orientation, where users rotate 2D images to an
upright position. Evaluation included a “Happiness Study” to
determine participants’ preference for either a traditional text-
based CAPTCHA or the image-orientation variant. Participants
were asked to solve both types of CAPTCHA, five times each.
They would then identify their preferred method in a free-
text box, where 11 of 16 participants preferred the image
orientation variant. It was noted that “many users [of the text-
based CAPTCHA] referenced feeling like they were at an eye
exam while deciphering the text” [p. 849].
Ho et al. [13] proposed metrics for quantifying the usability
of CAPTCHAs, engaging with participants through a game
which tracks completion of CAPTCHAs as a measure of
progress. Surveys were deliberately avoided, specifically as a
way to manage study resourcing. The work posits that the
most appropriate way to assess CAPTCHA usability is to
ask many people to solve CAPTCHAs repeatedly. Metrics
included completion time, typing error, and number of aban-
doned CAPTCHA solving attempts.
Belk et al. [2] investigated the link between users’ cognitive
styles (by way of a psychometric-based survey) and both per-
formance with text- or picture-based CAPTCHAs challenges
and preferred form of CAPTCHA. The motivating observation
is that CAPTCHAs should minimise cognitive effort. Results
are reported for 131 participants, who chose to complete either
a text- or picture-based CAPTCHA (where the choice was
recorded as their preference). Users overwhelmingly preferred
text-based CAPTCHAs, where this is attributed to familiarity.
Notably, the work implies that users can both exercise a choice
and have individual qualities informing that choice, where here
we explore influential factors from the perspective of user
context and perceived workload.
Yan and Ahmed [22] defined a framework for assessing the
usability of both text- and audio-based CAPTCHAs, along
dimensions of distortion, content, and presentation. Evalua-
tion by the authors – essentially as subject-matter experts
– identified a number of factors which could reduce the
approachability of a CAPTCHA for humans (e.g., use of
unfamiliar character strings, use of colour).
Studies on CAPTCHAs have suffered from methodological
shortcomings. In their evaluation of Chimera CAPTCHAs that
use merged objects, Fujita et al. [8] asked leading questions
such as “Is it easy solving the CAPTCHA?” and “If you
choose 1 or 2 in Question 1, please write why you think that
it is not.”; the participant might then rate the answer higher
than 2 to avoid explaining why they did not find it easy. The
question also suggests the researchers are not interested in
what made the CAPTCHA easy for the participant. In an eval-
uation of video-based CAPTCHA, Kluever and Zanibbi [15]
asked their participants: “Which task do you enjoy completing
more?” suggesting CAPTCHAs are there to be enjoyed.
In summary, studies aiming to evaluate the usability of
CAPTCHAs often fail to include a robust and comprehensive
methodology that would assess them under realistic conditions.
Nearly always participants are invited to studies to solve
CAPTCHAs, which might be priming and in dissonance with
reality where users go online not to solve CAPTCHAs, but to
accomplish some primary tasks (e.g., contribute to a forum).
Asking users about their experience has to be balanced and
open-ended to learn about the user perspective; studies until
now have mostly examined user performance, to confirm if
CAPTCHAs – or variants – are merely solvable. A holistic
user perspective is lacking, and the fit to users’ every-day
online tasks is not considered. Our study fills this gap and
studies two CAPTCHAs and a possible replacement in a
comprehensive study collecting qualitative and quantitative
data. We further explore user perceptions of CAPTCHAs as
initiated by previous studies.
III. METHODOLOGY
Our study looks at three human verification mechanisms:
reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. PlayThru differs from
reCAPTCHA by exploiting the (unwritten) rules of a themed
drag-and-drop game (e.g., putting a baseball with a baseball
glove). A PlayThru game appears as a small window similar
to a traditional text-based CAPTCHA, as in Figure 1. Small
icons represent different objects – some of these objects move
slightly to indicate that they can be selected with the mouse (or
by contact with a touch-sensitive screen). The moving objects
can be moved closer to a fixed object at the other side of the
PlayThru window. If according to the rules a selected object
relates to the fixed object, the user is verified as being a real
person and allowed to continue use of the website. The theme
of the host website can be integrated into a PlayThru game,
however here we use example games only to assess the use of
a ‘game’ as a challenge-response mechanism.
NoBot utilises a camera on the host device, and a remote
service which processes signatures of captured images against
a database of signatures. Although initially designed for au-
thentication, here NoBot is evaluated solely as a human veri-
fication mechanism. Using NoBot does not explicitly require
cognitive and physical effort, but requires that the user position
their face in view of the camera. NoBot initially appears in a
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small window similar to a traditional text-based CAPTCHA;
once the user activates the widget, NoBot enters a full-screen
mode with a fixed oval outline in the centre of the screen which
is overlaid on a white-on-black outline of what the device
camera sees (including the silhouette of the device user).
The oval outline changes colour to indicate when the user
has positioned themselves correctly, at which point they click
to begin image capture; a sequence of differently coloured
blank screens are presented while the camera captures images.
NoBot then returns to a widget embedded in the webpage; the
remote service will process the images, and the widget then
indicates if the user is verified as human and can continue
using the website.
There were three experimental conditions in the study. In
the first condition, participants were asked to complete three
ticket purchases on a laptop using a different human verifica-
tion mechanism each time (denoted as M3all): reCAPTCHA
(reCmix), PlayThru (PTmix) and NoBot (NBmix) with the order
of the mechanisms randomised for each participant. In the sec-
ond condition, participants completed a NoBot verification on
each occasion, using a laptop (NBLap). In the third condition,
participants followed the same process but on a tablet (NBTab).
PlayThru and NoBot both represent contrasts to CAPTCHAs,
but NoBot does so significantly enough to warrant study on
its own separate to the side-by-side comparison.
A. Study goals and hypotheses
The study aimed to learn about the user experience of three
human verification mechanisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and
NoBot. Since in real life security is not a user’s primary task,
in our study we tasked participants with buying three event
tickets and completing three distinct verification processes.
The following hypotheses were devised to assess the time
and workload required to verify using the mechanisms.
a) Time: We hypothesise that: (H1) there will be a
difference as to how fast participants verify between the three
mechanisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. We predict
that reCAPTCHA will be the fastest due to familiarity; (H2)
There will be a difference between the time that participants
take verify using NoBot on a laptop and a tablet; (H3) The
time needed to verify using NoBot will decrease with more
practice.
b) Workload: We hypothesise that: (H4) there will be
a difference in perceived workload between different human
verification mechanisms; (H5) There will be a difference in
perceived workload for NoBot on different devices.
B. Procedure
The following procedure applied to conditions NBLap and
NBTab. Upon participant’s arrival to the laboratory, the study
was briefly explained to them by the experimenter. The ex-
perimenter stressed that none of the technologies tested in
the study were created by the researchers themselves but by
external companies (where researchers acted as independent
assessors). The participant was asked if they were sensitive
to flashing lights (the NoBot capture process involves shining
light on the skin of a person’s face). If no sensitivity was
reported, they were then asked to read through the information
sheet and encouraged to raise any questions they might have,
after which they would sign a consent form. The experimenter
then switched on the voice recorder and the video-camera, and
the participant was asked to make three ticket purchases using
a mock-up ticket purchasing website.
When on the mock-up site, there were three steps: select a
ticket for an event of the participant’s choice, complete one
of the human verification processes, and then enter the details
(e.g., name, address) of a fictitious person named Adam/Anne
Johnson at the checkout to complete the transaction.
The experimenter stayed in the room throughout the session,
taking notes and reacting to any comments raised by the
participant, where responses were kept to an absolute mini-
mum. After the purchase of the third ticket, the experimenter
switched the camera off. The participant was then asked about
their experience with the mechanism they had just used, and
encouraged to voice any speculations they may have about
the purpose of the mechanism. The real purpose – if not
deduced already – would be revealed by saying it was to
replace CAPTCHAs and a print-out with various CAPTCHAs
was shown to make sure the participant knew what was being
referred to.
In a brief interview at the end of the study, each participant
was asked to elaborate on their experience with NoBot and
text-based CAPTCHAs. They were asked to discuss both their
advantages and disadvantages. After that, they were asked to
fill in the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire, pick
three adjectives that described their experience with NoBot and
indicate in what situations they would use it. When wrapping
up, each participant was asked if they would like the company
to keep or delete the images of their face taken in the study.
They were then thanked for coming to the study and received
£10 in cash for their participation.
In the third condition where participants tried all three
mechanisms (M3all), they were asked to fill in the afore-
mentioned questionnaires after each ticket purchase (i.e., after
having experienced each mechanism). They were also asked
to rank the three mechanisms in order of preference.
C. Apparatus
1) Purchasing website: A ticket purchasing site called
“SimTikats” was created for the purpose of the study. It offered
different tickets for a variety of events ranging from concerts
to football matches.
2) Devices: We used a Dell E5540 laptop with a screen
size of 15′′ and a Nexus 7 tablet (2013 model) with a screen
size of 7′′.
3) Recordings: While participants were purchasing each
ticket, the time it took them to complete the verification
process was recorded via the website. A voice recorder was
used to capture participants’ reactions to the mechanisms and
their responses in the interviews. Participants’ interactions
with the devices were video-taped over their shoulder. For
3
participants in the mixed condition where there were ques-
tionnaires between purchases, the camera was switched off
and switched back on for the next purchase.
4) Questionnaires: Participants were asked to fill in the
following post-task questionnaires:
NASA TLX. A NASA TLX questionnaire [11] was used
to assess participants’ perceptions of the workload involved
in the human verification process. A pen and paper version
of NASA TLX was chosen since Noyes and Bruneau [18]
found that it required less cognitive effort than processing the
information on a screen. Participants were asked to complete
the full NASA TLX with cards for pairwise comparisons of the
different aspects of workload, to capture perceived importance
of the workload factors.
Adjectives. Participants were asked to pick three adjectives
from a list of 24 different adjectives that best described
their interaction with the mechanism. The population of the
adjective list was informed in part by the work of Benedek
and Miner [3], and partly by the adjectives suggested in the
pilot study. The adjectives were displayed in two columns –
positive on the left and negative on the right – to shorten the
reading time that was needed.
Different contexts. Since usability and acceptance are contex-
tual, participants were asked to indicate in which contexts they
would be willing to use the mechanism(s). There was a list of
seven different contexts (Table V) which were taken from real-
life uses of CAPTCHAs. For each, participants could choose
from three options: “Sure, no problem.”, “No, no way.” or “I
don’t do this.” if they never engaged in an activity (e.g., had
never contributed to an online forum).
D. Participants
Participants were recruited through UCL’s Psychology Sub-
ject Pool. Age ranged from 18 to 53 years. Mean age was
25.5 (SD = 6.8). Of 87 participants, 57 were female and 30
were male. Four participants had A-Levels (UK school leaving
certification), 29 some undergraduate education (no completed
degree), 27 an undergraduate degree, 26 a postgraduate degree
(Masters or PhD) and one person had vocational training. We
had 27 participants in condition M3all, 31 in NBLap and 29 in
NBTab.
E. Ethics
Several measures were taken to protect study participants.
There was a written agreement put in place with NoBot’s
developer that if requested by the participant, they will delete
the images of participants’ faces taken in the study. During
the study, participants were asked to enter the details of a
persona rather than their own. Participants’ interactions with
the website were video-taped over their shoulder so as not
to record their faces. The study design and protocol was
reviewed and approved by UCL’s Research Ethics Committee
(3615/004). We implemented requests from the committee,
specifically that the information sheet inform participants that
one of the mechanisms will take images of their face, and that
we ask if they are sensitive to flashing lights.
IV. RESULTS
A. Quantitative results
1) Time: The set-up of the website used for the experiment
was such that the verification was on a separate page, partic-
ipants had to verify using reCAPTCHA, PlayThru or NoBot
and then click the ‘Continue’ button underneath (Fig. 1). This
set-up mimics the one encountered on real ticket purchasing
sites where the CAPTCHA is either on a separate page or
as an overlay. When establishing how long participants took
to verify, we consider the time how long they spent on the
verification webpage. There are several factors that might
have influenced the timings: website design (participants often
pressed ‘Continue’ instead of verifying first and then pressing
‘Continue’), speed and reliability of the Internet connection,
participants making verbal comments, reading instructions for
PlayThru and NoBot and any need to repeat the process (e.g.,
failures due to not being positioned in view of the camera).
Three mechanisms. In the mixed condition where par-
ticipants tried all three mechanisms once, it took them on
average 20.2 seconds (SD = 13.4) to solve a reCAPTCHA,
28.7 seconds (SD = 13.9) to complete a PlayThru game
and 70.1 seconds (SD = 50.7) to verify using NoBot. A
repeated measures ANOVA determined that the time taken to
verify using each mechanism differed statistically significantly
(F(1.23, 35.681) = 27.076, p < 0.0001). There were no
significant order effects. H1 is therefore supported.
Laptop vs. tablet. Figure 2 shows the time needed to verify
using NoBot across devices and trials. On average, across the
three trials participants took 42.2 seconds on a laptop and 54.4
seconds on a tablet, this difference is statistically significant
(p = 0.022, two-tailed t-test). H2 is therefore supported.
Practice. A repeated measures ANOVA determined that
the time taken to verify on a laptop (NBLap) differed sig-
nificantly between different attempts to verify using NoBot
(F(1.964, 54.986) = 5.673, p = 0.006). Post-hoc tests using the
Bonferroni correction revealed that participants’ verification
time dropped with practice from the first to second verification
(50.3 vs. 41.2), which was not statistically significant (p =
0.131). Again, time to verify using NoBot dropped between
the second and the third verification (41.2 vs. 35) but this
difference was not statistically significant either (p = 0.549).
However, there was a statistically significant difference be-
tween the first and the third verification (p = 0.011).
Fig. 1. A page from the study website showing PlayThru.
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Fig. 2. Average time (in seconds) to verify using NoBot across devices and
trials.
A repeated measures ANOVA determined that the time
taken to verify on a tablet (NBTab) differed signifi-
cantly between different attempts to verify using NoBot
(F(1.983, 53.528) = 4.686, p = 0.014). Post-hoc tests using the
Bonferroni correction revealed that participants’ verification
time dropped with practice from the first to second verification
(78.7 vs. 44.7), which was statistically significant (p = 0.003).
Again, time dropped between the second and the third verifi-
cation (44.7 vs. 40.9) but this difference was not statistically
significant. However, there was a statistically significant dif-
ference between the first and the third verification (p = 0.009).
H3 is therefore supported.
2) Workload (NASA TLX): Table I shows NASA TLX
scores for using reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. Frustra-
tion was the only aspect of workload with a significant differ-
ence between the three mechanisms F(1.93, 54.036) = 7.132,
p = 0.002). Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
revealed that participants reported a frustration of 8.73 for re-
CAPTCHA and 6.31 for PlayThru, which was not statistically
significant (p = 0.167). The difference between reCAPTCHA
and NoBot (8.73 vs. 11.7) was not significant either (p = 0.27).
However, there was a statistically significant difference be-
tween PlayThru and NoBot (6.31 vs. 11.7) (p = 0.002). H4 is
therefore partially supported.
TLX aspect reCAP PlayThru NoBot P-value
Mental Demand 10.75 9.24 8.89 0.62, n.s.
Physical Demand 4.33 8.45 8.34 0.64, n.s.
Temporal Demand 4.62 3.08 6.47 0.59, n.s.
Performance 3.62 5.46 5.51 0.38, n.s.
Effort 8.12 8.21 6.46 0.71, n.s.
Frustration 8.73 6.31 11.7 0.002**
Overall workload 48.4 37 46.7 0.19, n.s.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF NASA TLX SCORES FOR RECAPTCHA, PLAYTHRU
AND NOBOT.
Table II presents the NASA TLX scores for using NoBot on
a laptop and a tablet. Although the scores tended to be higher
for the tablet, the difference was only significant for Physical
Demand. H5 is therefore partially supported.
3) Adjectives: Tables III and IV show the top five adjectives
participants selected to describe the mechanism(s) they used.
On both devices, participants found NoBot “effortless”,
“intuitive” and “easy to use”. However, the perceptions of
TLX aspect Laptop Tablet P-value
Mental Demand 4.2 4.8 0.13, n.s.
Physical Demand 2.9 7.2 0.004**
Temporal Demand 5.6 5.1 0.85, n.s.
Performance 7.2 7.9 0.5, n.s.
Effort 5.4 7 0.18, n.s.
Frustration 5.4 5.4 0.4, n.s.
Overall workload 29.9 37.4 0.13, n.s.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF NASA TLX SCORES FOR VERIFYING USING NOBOT ON
A LAPTOP AND TABLET.
Laptop Tablet
effortless 13 effortless 11
fast 9 intuitive 10
intuitive 8 slow 9
weird 7 easy to use 8
easy to use 6 acceptable 8
TABLE III
TOP FIVE ADJECTIVES CHOSEN TO DESCRIBE USING NOBOT ON A LAPTOP
AND TABLET.
speed differed. For ‘fast’, 9 participants chose this adjective to
describe NoBot on a laptop and 7 participants on the tablet. For
‘slow’, 1 participant picked the adjective to describe NoBot
on a laptop and 9 participants on the tablet. This difference is
statistically significant (p = 0.037, Fisher’s exact test.)
reCAPTCHA PlayThru NoBot
normal 14 acceptable 14 unpredictable 9
acceptable 13 exciting 9 weird 9
effortful 9 effortless 7 creepy 8
easy to use 8 intuitive 7 fast 8
predictable 7 great 8 effortful 6
TABLE IV
TOP FIVE ADJECTIVES CHOSEN TO DESCRIBE RECAPTCHA, PLAYTHRU
AND NOBOT.
However, participants were far less positive about NoBot
in the mixed condition. While they found reCAPTCHA and
PlayThru to be “normal” and “acceptable”, NoBot was “un-
predictable”, “weird” and “creepy”. Interestingly, NoBot was
the only mechanism that was described as “fast” within the
top five adjectives.
4) Different contexts: Table V shows the percentages of
participants willing to use the three mechanisms in different
contexts. The results from conditions NBLap and NBTab were
combined as NBL+T since there was no statistically significant
difference between them. Overall, participants indicated they
were most willing to use the mechanisms for ticket purchasing
which is no surprise since this was the scenario used in our
study.
Participants were least willing to verify when contributing
to a forum using PlayThru and NoBot. For PlayThru, some of
them explained the game was not serious enough in the context
of a serious activity. For NoBot, six participants stressed that
the nature of forums is that one wants to stay anonymous.
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Context NBL+T reCmix PTmix NBmix
Contributing to an online forum 16 59 15 24
Buying tickets online 76 93 79 55
Browsing for plane tickets 50 76 55 45
Checking in for flights online 62 86 54 52
Topping up your Oyster online 52 66 69 31
Bidding on items on eBay 38 66 69 31
Logging in to Facebook from a different computer 47 66 66 34
TABLE V
PERCENTAGES OF PARTICIPANTS WILLING TO USE RECAPTCHA, PLAYTHRU AND NOBOT IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS.
PT284 stated: “I would not use it for an online forum because
I don’t know who’s going to see that image, and in online
forums, there tends to be a lot of hackers, so I wouldn’t feel
comfortable doing that.” This reveals a common perception
that the service provider or other users would see the pictures
taken by NoBot which is, to our knowledge, not the intention
of the company.
5) Ranking: Towards the end of each study session, par-
ticipants were asked to rank the mechanisms in order of their
preference. There were five choices: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru,
NoBot, no CAPTCHA-like mechanism and a different mech-
anism. Figure 3 shows how many participants ranked the
mechanisms on each position.
Fig. 3. Numbers of participants in M3all providing rankings for each
mechanism and hypothetical alternatives. Mechanisms ordered from highest
to lowest average rank.
reCAPTCHA had the highest average rank followed by
PlayThru, a different mechanism and NoBot. “No CAPTCHA-
like mechanism” seemed to be the least desirable choice, it
had the lowest average rank and was never ranked as the
top choice. PM06 motivated their choice of ranking it low by
saying: “I expect there is probably some benefit to all of us to
having some kind of a security mechanism on some websites
and some purchasing processes. I definitely wouldn’t want to
get rid of it altogether, not that I know in much detail what
benefits they have.”
PM00 explained their ranking: “I have always being using
that, and it’s a habit although it’s sometimes quite difficult to
read the letters but I feel cool with it. The PlayThru, it’s like
4The first letter of the participant number indicates which condition they
were in: “M”–M3all, “L”–NBLapand “T”–NBTab.
a game, it’s not very serious so I don’t. . . but I still quite like
it though. If we don’t have the reCAPTCHA, I’m OK with the
PlayThru. [Why?] It’s easy, it’s fun and then you don’t really
put effort to do that.” Similarly, PM03 stressed the importance
of being used to reCAPTCHA: “It [PlayThru] disturbed my
usual routine, it required some kind of effort which actually I
didn’t exhort that much, I just guessed through it and it was
correct what I did. If not I imagine, it would have been very
frustrating. So this one [reCAPTCHA] is fine and I’m more
comfortable with doing it.”
B. Qualitative results
Any comments participants made about the mechanisms
tested were transcribed and coded by two researchers. Each
researcher coded half of the transcripts and both coded a subset
of six transcripts (two from each condition) and they discussed
any differences. The following sections present the results of
the thematic analysis [4] of the data.
1) Views on text-based CAPTCHAs: Throughout the study
sessions, participants shared their experiences with text-based
CAPTCHAs, which were overwhelmingly negative. “Annoy-
ing” (44 mentions), “frustrating” (20) and “hate” (10) were the
most common words participants used to describe their expe-
riences with CAPTCHAs. Out of 87 participants, 64 stressed
they found CAPTCHAs to be hard to read. 13 participants
could not tell if the CAPTCHA characters were case-sensitive.
28 participants stated their coping strategy for reCAPTCHAs
was just to press the ‘Refresh’ button and try another one.
PL27 demanded something had to be done: “[CAPTCHAs]
are just annoying, they should find a better system.”
When considering CAPTCHAs and alternatives, it is also
important to be sensitive to how this technology might impact
users and their wellbeing. As shown by previous research
(e.g., [1]), security technologies can cause embarrassment and
make users feel bad about themselves. CAPTCHAs have this
potential too, PM08 stated: “I struggle several times to give
the right answer, I’ll search the Internet, I feel like an idiot,
then I abandon it and find another website that does the same
thing.” PL08 explained in a similar vein: “I actually hate all
of these because sometimes I really can’t see properly, I’m not
a robot but I just can’t see, you know, and I keep refreshing
the CAPTCHA. It’s quite troublesome.”
2) Perceptions of time and effort: We observed a discrep-
ancy between actual and perceived length of the verification
processes. To investigate this, we compared the actual timings
of mechanism use with comments about mechanism speed
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as made by participants in the comparative condition. To
illustrate, PM10 stated “for me I’d want to do things much
quicker, so I’d prefer NoBot as it’s faster so I can get the tickets
I want.” This participant’s actual timings were 43 seconds for
reCAPTCHA, 19 for PlayThru and 53 for NoBot meaning
NoBot was actually the slowest. Overall, we identified six such
discrepancies. In four cases, NoBot was perceived to be faster
than it actually was. One can speculate why this is the case,
PM14 explained: “[PlayThru] was quick but it didn’t really
matter because it was a game, it was nice, [it could even take
longer because it’s nice], you could get sidetracked a little bit
but it’s nice.” It seems one does not notice the passage of time
when the activity is entertaining.
What we believe might explain this difference in perceptions
could be the fact that the effort expended was coloured by the
type of effort required, for NoBot there was less physical and
cognitive effort and mostly time. PM01 stated: “It’s the first
time the screen just recognises my face and don’t need to do
anything, just stay here, effortless.” The participants further
explained what made this experience so fast, saying: “[For
PlayThru] I still need to read the sentence to know what they
want me to do. I need to think and for NoBot, I just stay here
and it’s done.”
Participants had the tendency to rationalise why the veri-
fication effort required of them was justified. Some stressed
by completing CAPTCHAs they contributed to the services
remaining available online, otherwise they would need to
physically go to a box office to purchase tickets. The inconve-
nience of CAPTCHAs was perceived as small relative to the
convenience of being able to buy tickets over the Internet.
Additionally, two participants stressed CAPTCHAs were a
good thing for society as they were used to digitise books.
Participants also had a good feeling about contributing to
overall Internet security. When asked why they ranked “no
CAPTCHA-like mechanism” the lowest, PM05 explained: “I
guess there was a reason why they had these in place. That is
I may not appreciate but it probably saves a lot time compared
to when a lot of machines would be entering stuff. If there was
no verification process at all, it would probably take longer
to filter through what’s simulated and what’s real.”
Some participants also expressed the view that CAPTCHAs
have to be hard to give them a sense of security, PM02
explained: “The chess one [PlayThru] was a bit simple, it
feels like anyone can do it, it feels actually less secure,
although I guess it’s just checking if you are human. [. . . ] And
PlayThru might actually be the best out of the three because
reCAPTCHA still requires a bit more effort than PlayThru, I
think [. . . ] I think it’s quite easy to use so I feel like everyone
and anyone could use it whereas with reCAPTCHA you have
to go through some effort and NoBot, you have to fit your
face. But PlayThru, because it’s so easy and accessible, I feel
like it’s too easy in a way.” The experimenter then asked why
CAPTCHAs had to be hard, and the participant explained that
a hard CAPTCHA gave them time to think through whether
they wanted to complete a transaction: “Let’s say if you’re
buying something and it’s too easy, you’d just got through
with it and if you want to change your mind or something, it’s
kind of too late.”
Apart from giving participants a sense of security or a
moment longer to re-consider the transaction, we also saw that
some participants over-attributed the security that CAPTCHAs
gave them, assigning them ‘powers’ they do not have. When
asked why they rated “no CAPTCHA-like mechanism” the
lowest, PM04 stated “If my information was stolen, my credit
card and there was nothing to check that it wasn’t me making
the purchase. [Do reCAPTCHAs help with this?] But it
helps fight spam bots too. If someone stole my password, my
information was say Ticketmaster UK, if it was hacked and my
information was stored, someone can buy a ticket. If someone
can hack Sony, they can hack Ticketmaster.”
3) Security: When asked about their experience with the
mechanisms, participants often expressed views on their secu-
rity, rather than just usability or acceptability. Interestingly,
they perceived the security of the mechanisms not based
on how difficult they are for bots to solve and how well
they protect the website, but they spoke about how well
their transaction details are protected and how their images
will be stored. 32 participants described scenarios where the
security of their images would be compromised, for example
if the company was hacked. Also, rather than thinking of
these mechanisms as black boxes, many participants actively
deliberated how they operated, with 17 participants actively
questioning their resilience against attacks and thinking of
ways to break them, for example through the use of pictures
or masks.
PT28 explained they were not sure it CAPTCHAs were
providing any security at all: “I really really hate them, they
give you a hurdle to jump over and you’ve been onto that
site 100 times, I find them really infuriating, I don’t even
know if they work, I can’t see the point of them. I can’t
read them, they’re too close or the letters are at an angle,
or they have these dots which sometimes you can’t see.” The
CAPTCHA hurdle is even more frustrating if the user is under
time pressure, PM07 told us their story: “A couple of months
ago, I was ready half an hour before they [the tickets] even
went online, I had everything ready, my information. And then
I like got through and I got the ticket and it had this thing
that. . . CAPTCHA box, it’s called. And the laptop that I was
on had an ad blocker or something, every time that I typed the
word that was in it, it wouldn’t allow it and I was so panicking,
I had to get that ticket. . . I didn’t realise I had to turn it. . .
that I had to change some settings to allow it or it was or I
genuinely couldn’t read it, so I tried to play the audio but that
was confusing and I oh. . . then I ended up losing the ticket.
Basically, I did get another one but it was pretty stressful.”
Five participants were disillusioned with human verification
mechanisms in general saying they were protecting the busi-
nesses that used them rather than the users. PL15 talked about
NoBot: “I’m even less inclined for people to use my photo,
you know, just for the company’s benefit. That is something
that fully identifies you and it’s actually for the company’s
benefit more than even my own. OK, it’s security of buying my
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own ticket, so probably I would be even less inclined actually.
Especially for what it’s asking for to protect a company, no!
[. . . ] It would make me more productive because it’s quick
and easy, but only by a couple of minutes. . . It’s being sold
to me that it’s actually for my protection but it’s not.”
4) Privacy of images: Often after their first encounter
with NoBot, participants speculated that NoBot is there for
identification rather than verification that they are human. This
is not surprising since the technology is using a biometric
solution. In the case of our mock-up ticket-buying website, 18
participants thought that a picture of them was taken, to check
if it is really them when they turn up at the event venue.
Throughout the study sessions participants raised privacy
concerns with NoBot capturing and storing images of their
faces. 29 participants did not like the fact that someone could
see their picture, and within this group, they either worried
about the service provider such as the ticket purchasing site
seeing their images, or other parties such as the NoBot
company or other users of the website (such as other forum
members or bidders on eBay). Ten participants emphasised
that they did not like the possibility that a company capturing
personal images might store the images and not delete them.
When asked about what specifically invoked privacy con-
cerns, eight participants stressed that a human face is special,
by which they meant it was unique and identifying. Partici-
pants also elaborated on what kind of reassurance they would
need to be able to use NoBot confidently. Ten participants
would have liked a confirmation that images will be kept
securely or deleted. Nine participants would have welcomed
a privacy statement and two the display of security certifi-
cates. Interestingly, seven people stressed they would be more
confident using NoBot if they saw that other people were
using it too. Related to this, 20 participants emphasised that
the technology was novel and they needed to develop a trust
relationship with it.
There were also participants who said they were too ig-
norant to care, PM03 explained: “Maybe some persons are
not comfortable with showing their face. [What about you?] I
am comfortable with doing that. When you are ignorant about
computer systems, what they do with your data and all that, it’s
easier for you to give information. I’m kind of like that person
so I don’t really mind giving my face. I can trust the privacy
statements that they give.” PM05 noted that there might be a
trade-off between privacy and convenience: “I prefer the two
to NoBot because they are less invasive but equally there was
a little bit more effort than the reCAPTCHA.”
5) Context of use: Throughout the study sessions, partic-
ipants specified situations where they believed it would be
appropriate to use the different mechanisms. This was in part
prompted by them being asked to indicate their willingness
to use mechanism in different contexts for which we describe
the results earlier, but even before being prompted participants
elaborated on when they would or would not use it and why.
Six participants stressed that using NoBot would be more
suitable for high-value purchases where there is more money
at stake, PM06 explained: “I guess if someone is buying
something more expensive, there is kind of more risk of fraud,
using someone else’s details. In that case, it might be a lot
more beneficial but other than that I don’t think it’s necessary
for small amounts of money or like logging in to things,
it’s definitely a bit extreme.” Because online contexts vary,
9 participants emphasised they would like to be given choice
which mechanism they would like to use to verify.
Some participants also explained that they would not like
for the image of their face to be associated with what they
were buying, PM05 explained: “I liked it less because I don’t
like putting my face on the Internet; taking a picture of me
and who knows what I’m buying.” This again had to do
with participants’ perceptions of NoBot as an identification
mechanism that shares the images with the service provider.
26 participants stated that NoBot is too invasive or heavy-
handed for simply checking if the user is human. PM04
explained: “I’m trying to buy a ticket and not getting into
a governmental building. It seems a bit much.” They further
elaborated: “I do support some sort of verification but I prefer
getting less of myself, as in my face, facial recognition if I have
to. Obviously, if that was part of my job or my livelihood, I
wouldn’t have a problem with NoBot, the visual confirmation,
personal recognition but for purchasing tickets it’s a bit too
much.”. Other participants stressed that the gain in security is
not worth the loss in privacy, PM06 explained: “I can see why
it would sometimes be useful in terms of fraudulent activity
and purchasing things but I still don’t think it’s worth the
breach of privacy to store an image of anyone ever who buys
anything online or tried to log in to a website.”
6) Control: There was a recurring theme amongst partic-
ipants of not feeling in control when using NoBot, because
the outcome of the verification process depended on many
factors that were outside of their influence. PM04 stressed:
“You’re kind of held hostage to the quality of the camera.”
Participants emphasised that they feel more in control with
reCAPTCHA because it is for them to read and enter the
characters and they can always ‘try harder’ if the system does
not accept their submission. With NoBot, they can only do as
much as positioning themselves in front of the camera, and if
the system decides they are not human, there is little more that
they can do to change the outcome. PT26 explained: “[About
reCAPTCHA] I really don’t mind having several attempts
actually it’s not something that is annoying and it’s easy to do.
This [NoBot] can have similar potential problems, my picture
couldn’t be taken properly, had to try several times, three times
that was annoying and I’m not sure why, could be the flashes,
really testing my patience, perhaps that’s no fault of my own.
With CAPTCHA, I know it was somehow my fault, because I
didn’t interpret the [letters] and numbers correctly, the [letters]
are there, I might have misread it, it works better next time
around, I’ve a certain amount of control [over] the CAPTCHA
system compared to this NoBot system. . . ”
Similarly, PL11 said they would not rely on NoBot for
critical activities because they considered verifying using a
text-based CAPTCHA to be more reliable: “like checking in
for flights, I would not use NoBot because there might be some
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error and I could not check in for my flight. Then I would use
the traditional because it’s easier, I can refresh the images and
try again, so I think it would be faster. So if there is something
urgent, I would not use it [NoBot]. But for every-day uses, I
would advocate this.”
Similarly, PL16 expressed being worried about system fail-
ure: “I’d be concerned that just because you know computers
and machines and that have been proven to be imperfect,
I’d be a little bit concerned about it being maybe not able
to accurately read my face. It’s just the squiggly words,
CAPTCHAs, it’s just the way these words sometimes, the
letters are undecipherable which is a kind of quality imper-
fection, if you will. I’d be concerned that someday, one of
these websites wouldn’t be able to read my face and I can’t
get in. And if it’s an important one, let’s say self-assessment
[tax submission] or checking in online or something, then I’m
really screwed because of a system failure.”
Worries over NoBot’s reliability also revealed participants’
mental models of security, PL17 elaborated: “I wouldn’t really
use it though personally because I’ve had fraud on my debit
card before so I don’t trust this kind of thing anymore. I would
rather do it myself using the CAPTCHA or get it from the
tickets’ case, I’d just get it from some office and do it. Then
I know I properly get it myself and then there is no fraud
in it. Whereas with the face thing, no.” PL18 expressed they
had a low level of tolerance for the inaccuracy of security
measures: “If something is to guard me, protect me and if it’s
not accurate, it pisses me off, you know. It’s like having a
guard at a gate who is a drunk.”
PL14 stressed that they would not like to be photographed
when buying something sensitive but they would see the
advantage of storing a picture in case a criminal successfully
completed a transaction in their name: “I’m actually not sure
about the picture though, yeah. Because I wouldn’t want them
to know, if it’s for verification purchases, then why do you
need to store the picture? [. . . ] Sometimes I think it’s useful
to store pictures though. Let’s say some criminal wants to buy
some. . . purchase something online and then the police can
find out who bought that thing online and they can use that
image to find the criminal. I don’t know. But what are the
chances of this happening?”
7) Obstacles to adoption: Participants mentioned several
factors that could be obstacles to the adoption of PlayThru
and NoBot in particular. For NoBot, 22 participants stressed
that not every computer had a camera, and 21 stressed that
users’ sensitivity to flashing lights might prevent them from
using it. For PlayThru, some participants stated that the tasks
might not be understandable to everyone, particularly where
the rules of the game were culturally specific.
V. DISCUSSION
Verification using reCAPTCHA was the fastest, followed by
PlayThru, then NoBot. The level of frustration felt by partic-
ipants differed across the mechanisms, with NoBot being the
most and PlayThru the least frustrating. Several participants
emphasised that it is hard to compare reCAPTCHA with the
other mechanisms, due to a familiarity with CAPTCHAs. This
is supported by the results, where “normal” and “acceptable”
were the top adjectives used to describe reCAPTCHA. Par-
ticipants were largely annoyed by traditional CAPTCHAs but
emphasised they understood they were there to add security,
although they were not always clear about how this security
advantage was afforded. reCAPTCHA also had the advantage
of having been around for longer which was a source of
trust, PM26 explained: “the fact that it already exists, is pre-
existing, somebody approved it somewhere, it’s been around
a while. . . that seems fairly safe.” Where participants ranked
no CAPTCHA-like mechanism as the least favourable option
it indicates that security was seen as important.
In the conditions where participants completed ticket trans-
actions with NoBot three times in succession, verification
became quicker over time. Participants were significantly
faster verifying using NoBot on a laptop than on a tablet, rating
use on a tablet as more physically demanding and slower.
Completion times on the tablet decreased rapidly after initial
use of NoBot, becoming comparable to completion times on a
laptop – unfamiliarity with tablets may have compounded the
learning demands for some participants.
In the mixed condition, we saw a number of discrepancies
between actual and perceived time to verify. Perceptions of
time could have been coloured by the entertainment factor of
PlayThru and NoBot, as well as their novelty. In future work,
one could examine if perceptions would change as a person
becomes familiar with the technology.
Participants often assumed NoBot was used to identify
rather than verify them, due to the capturing of a biometric.5
The NoBot face capture mechanism is implicit, but preparation
disrupts the flow of the primary task (positioning the face in
front of the device camera and remaining still, etc.). NoBot
was the most time-consuming of the mechanisms, which might
have lead to increased frustration.
We compared use of NoBot on a laptop three times in
sequence with a single use of NoBot in the comparative con-
dition. Participants were more critical of NoBot in the mixed
condition, calling it “unpredictable”, “weird” and “creepy”
rather than “effortless”, “fast” and “intuitive” as when used in
isolation. We are careful not to draw any far reaching conclu-
sions from this since two factors vary between the conditions:
repeated vs. single use, and having direct comparison with
other mechanisms and having only one mechanism. We can
only speculate that repeated use might have made participants
more accepting of the technology, or that direct comparison
may have encouraged participants to be more critical. This
would confirm an important design rule – when asked to
evaluate a technology, users should be shown more than one
design to be able to compare and better articulate their needs
and preferences through relative assessment.
In our study, users reported they would make the decision of
whether to use NoBot based on the context of use. Users found
NoBot too heavy-handed for more frequent and low-value
5We describe the perception of NoBot as a biometric in [17].
9
transactions yet more appropriate for high-value transactions.
This is similar to the findings by Krol et al. [16] where
participants believed that a more time-consuming mechanism
should be used for infrequent and high-value transactions. This
can be related to CAPTCHAs, in that a number of partici-
pants believed that security should be difficult. To consider
future work, one of the limitations of our study is that we
tested our mechanisms on a sample of participants who were
relatively young and well-educated, which might limit the
generalisability of our findings. Testing the mechanisms in
the wild with a wider range of services would be a next step.
Our findings can inform development of a repeatable usability
assessment framework. Future work could develop instructions
for technologies which adequately explain their operation as
part of the primary task, since participants have been shown
to be accepting of security processes if these are explained to
them [6].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Here we conducted a study with 87 participants, examining
the user experience of three human verification mechanisms:
reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. 29 participants used all
three mechanisms once, 27 used NoBot three times in succes-
sion on a laptop, and 31 similarly using NoBot on a tablet. Our
results show that participants were on average fastest verifying
using reCAPTCHA, followed by PlayThru and NoBot. NASA
TLX results showed that participants were the most frustrated
by NoBot and the least by PlayThru.
For NoBot tested on two devices, we saw that using it on a
tablet created significantly more physical demand than when
using a laptop. Results indicated participants using NoBot on a
tablet in fact reported experiencing increased physical demand.
Participants disliked reCAPTCHAs but saw them as a nec-
essary evil, trusting that they were there for the right reasons.
Participants using PlayThru thought the entertainment factor
made it easy to use, but the game-based format came across as
unsuitable for serious online activities. For NoBot, participants
did not notice the passage of time when verifying using NoBot,
but they objected to the collection and storage of their images.
Participants were more positive towards NoBot when used
in isolation rather than in combination with other mechanisms.
This highlights the need for the field of usable security to de-
velop robust and repeatable evaluation methods for alternatives
of technologies. Our study is a first step towards this, focusing
not only on solvability but on the holistic user experience.
Our holistic study approach stands out from previous re-
search of CAPTCHAs and usability of CAPTCHAs in several
ways. Prior studies examined how the difficulty of human
verification is pushed to users, without fully capturing the
user’s perspective. We do not see humans as CAPTCHA
solving machines, but as individuals who consider the effort of
security in terms of their goals and expectations [12]. Another
challenge is to afford effortless security that strikes the right
balance between providing reassurance and demanding effort,
as users recognise a need for security.
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